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abstract: prior to engaging in the process of fully realizing the notion of speculative philosophy 
in hegel’s system, the thinker must arrive at the appropriate reflective standpoint via two 
preliminary justificatory cycles. This paper examines the phenomenological and logical cycles 
of justification undertaken respectively in the Phenomenology of  Spirit and the doctrines of Being 
and essence of the Science of  Logic in order to offer an account of the meaning and demands of 
speculative justification. We argue that as enactments of the self-determination characterizing 
speculative thinking, these justificatory cycles must be understood in terms of the role and 
position that the thinker occupies in science.
keywords: hegel; speculative Justification; Thinker
to conceive the spiritual spiritually (lhp ii 9)1
aristotle was the first to say that νους is the thought of thought. The 
result is the thought which is at home with itself, and at the same 
time embraces the universe, and transforms it into an intelligent 
world (lhp iii 546).2
1. inTroducTion
for hegel the practice of speculative thought, or ‘science’, involves two cycles of 
justification that are preliminary to the final act of fully realizing science’s notion, that 
of knowing absolutely. Whereas the first cycle is associated with the Phenomenology of  
Spirit the second concerns the formulation and development of the logical categories in 
     1. g. W. f. hegel, Lectures on the History of  Philosophy, trans. e. s. haldane and frances h. simson, vol. ii 
plato and the platonists, 3 vols., lincoln, university of nebraska press, 1995, p. 9 (henceforth lhp ii).
     2. g. W. f. hegel, Lectures on the History of  Philosophy, trans. e. s. haldane and frances h. simson, vol. iii 
Medieval and Modern philosophy, 3 vols., lincoln, university of nebraska press, 1995, p. 546 (henceforth 
lhp iii).
Toula nicolacopoulos and george vassilacopoulos 85
the sections of the Science of  Logic entitled respectively ‘The doctrine of Being’ (Being) 
and ‘The doctrine of essence’ (essence).3 hegel explains the first phenomenological 
justificatory cycle in the following terms:
[T]he individual has the right to demand that science should at least provide 
him with the ladder to this standpoint, should show him this standpoint within 
himself. his right is based on his absolute independence, which he is conscious of 
possessing in every phase of his knowledge; for in each one, whether recognized 
by science or not, and whatever the content may be, the individual is the absolute 
form, i.e. he is the immediate certainty of himself (ps ¶ 26). 
as to the second justificatory cycle, that consisting of Being and essence, hegel ob-
serves:
When […] the notion is called the truth of Being and essence, we must expect 
to be asked why we do not begin with the notion? The answer is that, where 
knowledge by thought is our aim, we cannot begin with the truth, because the 
truth, when it forms the beginning, must rest on mere assertion. The truth when 
it is thought must as such verify itself to thought (el § 159 a).4
Whereas the ‘individual’, or ‘consciousness’, requires the phenomenological cycle of jus-
tification, it is thought that necessitates the logical cycle. in both instances some sort of 
verification is sought: in the first science must verify itself to consciousness whereas in 
the second it is ‘truth’ that must verify itself to ‘thought’. 
hegel’s remarks on the nature and need for these two cycles of justification raise 
some fundamental questions. for one thing, why is it that the individual has the ‘right’ 
to make demands upon science? perhaps more importantly, where and how does the 
individual encounter science in the first place? one might also ask what it means for 
truth to verify itself to thought instead of the reverse. in what follows our aim will be to 
show how the answers to these questions, and indeed the whole issue of justification, are 
linked to a certain appreciation of the role of the speculative thinker in both the initial 
appearance and the subsequent development of science. 
The Question of  Justification
By way of introductory observations we can note further that hegel employs similar 
terms to speak of the importance of the two justificatory cycles. for example, about the 
activation of the Phenomenology of  Spirit phenomenological process he says: 
least of all will it be like the rapturous enthusiasm which, like a shot from a pistol, 
begins straight away with absolute knowledge, and makes short work of other 
standpoints by declaring that it takes no notice of them (ps ¶ 27). 
     3. g. W. f. hegel, The Phenomenology of  Spirit, trans. a.v. Miller, new york, oxford, 1977 (henceforth ps). 
g. W. f. hegel, Science of  Logic, trans. a.v. Miller, new Jersey, humanities press, 1997 (henceforth sl).
     4. g. W. f. hegel, The Encyclopaedia Logic (1830), with the Zusätze: Part I of  the Encyclopaedia of  Philosophical 
Sciences with the Zusätze, trans. Theodore f. geraets, W. a. suchting, and h. s. harris, indianapolis, hackett, 
1991, § 159 a (henceforth el).
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so too, when the question of the beginning of science arises in the Science of  Logic he-
gel once again warns against moving ‘like a shot from a pistol’ (sl 67). Moreover, the 
standpoint of science is similarly represented in relation to the two justificatory cycles. 
Just as in the Phenomenology science must take into account consciousness’ antithetical 
attitude to its object of knowledge, in the Science of  Logic it must take into account the 
inter-relations of logical categories that do not fully conform to the speculative demands 
of the notion. 
The abovementioned remarks draw our attention to the unacceptability of resting 
on ‘mere assertion’ to start the speculative project. so, what is the reason for think-
ing that science cannot properly begin by presupposing that absolute knowing is the 
natural orientation of thinking? one might suggest that in so far as science is philoso-
phy, and philosophy is radical questioning, science’s own justifiedness must be open 
to questioning. But this sort of response fails to take account of the radical ambitions 
characterizing the speculative orientation. in assuming a rather vague and free-floating 
sense of ‘philosophy’ it does not allow that science already takes itself to be philosophy 
as such or radically free thinking. if, as we will argue below, speculative thinking takes 
itself to be free or self-determining in the space of its own freedom, then a legitimate 
and philosophical questioning of science must be part of science’s self-orientation. in 
other words, science’s justificatory processes must be enactments of aspects of the full 
meaning of the radical freedom that defines speculative thinking. That is, they give rise 
to science in so far as they are activated, sustained and completed by science from within 
science. 
so, the legitimacy of raising the question of the justification of science must have 
to do with the facts that the thinker is already situated in science and that his or her 
insights emerge directly from within its space so to speak. it also follows that in so far as 
science relies upon the two justificatory cycles it must do so not because it cannot begin 
from the immediate unfolding of the absoluteness of absolute knowledge ‘like a shot 
from a pistol’ but, paradoxically, because it can. There is nothing from a technical point 
of view to stop science from activating its thinking by fully and immediately employ-
ing the kind of reflection already incorporated in the already available notion. indeed, 
science could very well have started its project from the section of the Science of  Logic 
entitled ‘subjective logic, or the doctrine of the notion’. in doing so, it would have by-
passed both the phenomenological process and the thinking involved in the doctrines 
of Being and essence. our claim is that speculative justification is not about deriving 
absolute knowledge that is supposedly initially either known only as a hypothesis, or, not 
yet known at all. nor does it rely on an independently justified process that thereby justi-
fies the results it derives. rather the process of justification is itself justified by what is 
an already available field of knowing, namely science. The sort of justification that the 
speculative demands is itself speculative. ultimately this means that from the outset the 
thinker and, consequently, thinking itself is not free-floating but embedded and com-
mitted. That science and everything related to it become an issue at all depend upon 
the fact that science ‘comes on the scene’ (ps ¶ 76) or, in other words, that the thinker 
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already dwells in the ‘truth’ that the ‘absolute’ is (ps ¶ 74).
so the need for justification has to do, not with the absence of absolute knowledge, 
but with its already achieved presence. for reasons to be explored in some detail below, 
precisely because science emerges by fully encountering itself as what it is, namely the 
mutual embracing of knowing and known, justification becomes an issue as an integral 
part of the absoluteness of this kind of knowledge. science’s possession of its notion is 
primordial and irreducible to any kind of original derivation beyond the very problem-
atic that is determined by the appearance of the notion itself. of course if this reading 
is correct then the popular hermeneutic idea that the aim of the Phenomenology is to 
lead the unenlightened consciousness to the standpoint of absolute knowledge must be 
misguided.5 in our paper we hope to show that to appreciate the radical meaning of 
justification is to see the speculative purpose often associated with the Phenomenology in 
a new light. 
Justification and the Thinker’s Role and Position in Science
so far we have suggested to appreciate that the logical justification of the notion 
is the truth of the forms of thinking practiced in Being and essence, and that the phe-
nomenological justification of science is the truth of consciousness, we must invoke the 
idea that, although it could do otherwise, science refrains from starting immediately 
from the activation of its already available notion. This refraining on the part of science 
becomes science’s place of dwelling so to speak through which it attempts justifiably to 
appropriate what it already is. starting from the above observation about the appearing 
of science, how should we understand the phenomenological and logical dimensions 
of science’s two-stage process of justification? We will be arguing that the two justifica-
tory cycles are best understood in relation to the thinker’s role and position in science. 
These must not only be accessible and available from the very beginning, but their 
very accessibility and availability must themselves be justifiable. To be sure, hegel at-
tributes a central role to the thinker as is evidenced by the remark in the ‘preface’ to his 
Phenomenology that the beginning of philosophy presupposes that consciousness should 
dwell in the element of ‘pure self-recognition’ (ps ¶ 26). indeed, in a number of places 
throughout the elaboration and discussion of his system hegel comments strategically 
on the position of the thinker. here is one example from an introduction to the lectures 
on the history of philosophy presented in 1823 and repeated in 1825 and 1827: 
Because the universal is there as objective, i have thought myself in it. i am myself 
contained in this infinite thing and at the same time have a consciousness of it. 
Thus at the standpoint of objectivity i remain at the same time at the standpoint 
of knowing, and i retain this standpoint (ilhp 166).6 
     5. see, for example, Terry pinkard, Hegel’s Phenomenology: The Sociality of  Reason, cambridge, new york and 
Melbourne, cambridge university press, 1996, pp. 16-17.
     6. g. W. f. hegel, Introduction to the Lectures on the History of  Philosophy, trans. T. M. knox and a.v. Miller, 
oxford, clarendon press, 1987, p. 166 (henceforth ilhp).
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again, in the ‘preface’ to his Philosophy of  Right he refers to thinkers as 
those in whom there has once arisen an inner voice bidding them to comprehend, 
not only to dwell in what is substantive while still retaining subjective freedom, but 
also to possess subjective freedom while standing not in anything particular and 
accidental but in what exists absolutely (pr § 12).7
The position of the thinker remains central irrespective of whether hegel is referring 
to the experience of political freedom and the individual’s relationship to the substan-
tiality of his communal being or to the experience of the speculative philosopher. our 
argument will be that from ‘the moment when science comes on the scene’ (ps ¶ 76) 
the thinker finds himself or herself dwelling, as a matter of fact, in the element that in 
turn makes this appearance possible through the thinker’s dwelling. Most decisively 
for the speculative experience, qua speculative dweller the thinker receives the absolute 
commandment ‘know thyself ’ (epM § 377).8 This receiving in turn gives rise to the 
most primordial emerging of science, an emerging that is constituted as the vision to 
think speculatively or purely. yet it is not enough for the thinker simply to dwell in the 
necessary element; he or she must also dwell in this dwelling in the sense of dwelling freely. 
nor is it enough for the thinker merely immediately to receive the command; he or she 
must also receive the receiving as a precondition for actually realizing the command to think 
speculatively or purely. What is received, as a matter of fact, must also be received freely. 
These two aspects, dwelling and receiving freely, are necessitated by the fact that the 
speculative claims consciousness as a self-determining thinker. Whereas the first act of 
freedom is performed in the Phenomenology, the second informs the thinking practiced in 
‘The doctrine of Being’ and ‘The doctrine of essence’. 
ii. The appearance of science and spiriT as ManifesTaTion
When science first emerges, it emerges in the world as a radical break from the 
world’s already given orientation. it is therefore a disturbance that takes place unexpect-
edly. The speculative moment appears and announces itself as this kind of break and it 
does so by claiming its thinker unconditionally and, from the standpoint of the latter, 
unexpectedly. The announcement is made to the thinker but it also comes through the thinker 
via a process that violently disassociates the thinker from the world in which he or she 
is otherwise absorbed in order to re-situate him or her in (the world through) absolute 
knowing. 
here, the thinker is exposed to the challenge of becoming a thinker in so far as sci-
ence unconditionally permeates and claims his or her being. But as well as belonging to 
science in this way, the thinker must also belong to this belonging freely. When in the 
position of the thinker, one is exposed to a calling that one hears with one’s whole being, 
     7. g. W. f. hegel, The Philosophy of  Right, trans. T. M. knox, oxford, 1980, § 12 (henceforth pr).
     8. g. W. f. hegel, Philosophy of  Mind: Being Part Three of  the Encyclopaedia of  the Philosophical Sciences (1830), 
Together with the Zusätze, trans. William Wallace and a. v. Miller, oxford, oxford, 1971, § 377 (henceforth 
epM).
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to an eruptive event whose radical transformative power demands a response. it follows 
that, rather than being claimed as a thinker for the reason that one already is a thinker 
independently of the claiming, one is a thinker-to-become in so far as one responds ap-
propriately to having been claimed as a thinker. ultimately, what matters is the resolve 
to stay with science. This is why we can never arrive at the speculative standpoint with 
the aid of some detached reasoning process or by impartially choosing from amongst a 
range of alternatives.9 
now, the break that the appearance of science marks between itself and the world 
also harbours a radical continuity that eventually makes possible the speculative engage-
ment of science with the world. Because the world and science are both moments of 
spirit their relating is determined by this co-belonging. according to hegel, the (formal) 
definition of spirit (or mind) is that it is manifestation and everything to do with spirit is 
manifested within such manifestation. More specifically, spirit is absolute manifestation 
since it is ultimately a pure, unqualified, revealing that reveals itself to itself: 
The manifestation of itself to itself is […] itself the content of mind and not, as 
it were, only a form externally added to the content; consequently mind, by its 
manifestation, does not manifest a content different from its form, but manifests 
its form which expresses the entire content of mind, namely, its self-manifestation 
(epM § 383 a).
in the full expression of spirit as manifestation spirit’s being incorporates thinking that 
reveals the very notion of manifestation. it thus allows this manifesting being to reveal 
itself to itself. as this unconditional and self-sustaining revealing, spirit is apprehended 
speculatively as a double embracing: being embraces thinking and embraced thinking 
embraces being. Being and thinking are thus two aspects of this embracing/embraced 
inter-relation that belong equally to spirit understood as manifestation in the above 
radical sense. 
This inter-relationship is at the heart of hegel’s account of reason in terms of the 
mutual ‘encompassing’ of the ego and its object: 
The essential and actual truth which reason is, lies in the simple identity of the 
subjectivity of the notion with its objectivity and universality. The universality 
of reason, therefore, whilst it signifies that the object, which was only given 
to consciousness qua consciousness, is now itself universal, permeating and 
encompassing the ego, also signifies that the pure ego is the pure form which 
overlaps the object and encompasses it (epM § 438). 
for hegel then spirit is the mutual informing of two seemingly antithetical movements. 
on the one hand, the ‘object’ is the infinite power (substance) that absolutely embraces 
the ‘ego’ that is unable to resist this embracing. on the other, rather than drowning in 
its absolute passivity, the ‘ego’ is at once the power (subject) freely to embrace the ‘ob-
ject’ that is in turn not in a position to prevent this kind of freedom from realizing itself. 
The passivity in question is absolute since it can accommodate a freedom whose infinity 
     9. see donald p. verene, Hegel’s Absolute: An Introduction to Reading the Phenomenology of  Spirit, albany, state 
university of new york press, 2007, p. 44.
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rests with its power to be informed by passivity without eliminating or being eliminated 
by it. Both subject and object are expressions of absolute manifestation given that each 
incorporates the other. 
still, the full expression of spirit as reason results from a process that is mediated by 
the division in spirit between the object or being and the thinking ego or, in other words, 
between world and science. it is as this division that the two moments of spirit inform 
or embrace each other, albeit only in principle, that is, only the realm of pure thinking. 
disassociated from the world, the thinker thinks the world as thinkable in the absence 
of the corresponding reflective embracing of this thinking by the world’s being.
how should we understand the beginning of philosophy in the light of this funda-
mental idea of spirit as (the principle of) reason and the abovementioned understand-
ing of the position of the thinker in relation to (the principle of) reason? To answer 
this question is to offer an interpretation of one of hegel’s more enigmatic observations 
that in our view is also most fundamental. We are referring to the observation that the 
‘beginning of philosophy presupposes or requires that consciousness should dwell in this 
element’ of ‘[p]ure self-recognition in absolute otherness, this aether as such, [which] 
is the ground and soil of science or knowledge in general’ (ps ¶ 26). What we want to 
argue here is that, as the precondition for philosophy, or science, the abovementioned 
dwelling of the thinker involves the encompassing (permeating) of consciousness (ego) by 
the universality of ‘pure self-recognition in absolute otherness’ (the thinkable object), but 
also consciousness’s potential for encompassing (thinking) pure self-recognition’s univer-
sality. as we have noted, this principle takes place in the division between thinking and 
being or, in other words, in the realm of absolute otherness. Moreover, in its capacity 
as dwelling in the universal, consciousness relates to itself as a universal, that is, as the 
thinker for whom thinking (philosophy) is an aim to be realized and hence that which 
must encompass the already encompassing pure self-recognition. leaving aside for the 
moment hegel’s reference to ‘absolute otherness’, we will proceed next to consider how 
spirit’s self-manifestation incorporates both the moment of pure self-recognition as such 
and the element of consciousness’ dwelling. 
The Meaning of  Pure Self-recognition
The abovementioned reference to ‘aether’ is meant to convey the sense that in the 
case of pure self-recognition we are dealing with the utter simplicity of recognition as 
such. if we understand ‘self-recognition’ through this guiding metaphor, we can appreci-
ate that the recognition in question does not happen as the contribution of an external 
agent. instead, it is pure or as such in that it takes place within itself so to speak and does 
not refer to anything that does not already belong to it qua recognition.
This immanence renders it immediately as manifestation. according to hegel, self-
recognition is ‘pure spirituality as the universal that has the form of simple immediacy’ 
(ps ¶ 26). hegel also refers to it as ‘this immediacy of spirit’ that is ‘the very substance of 
spirit’ (ps ¶ 26). as immediate manifestation that is not qualified by any specific form, 
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spirit encounters itself in its purity all at once without having to traverse a distance that 
might mark some sort of gap to be filled. 
still, given that as self-recognition this universal is living, some difference or other-
ness must be involved within its already given field of unimpeded operation. Moreover, 
the difference in question must be related to the particular as such as determined by 
the specificity of its infinite singularity. This specificity marks an absolute limit within 
pure self-recognition whose limiting activity intensifies the limitlessness of the latter’s 
immediate self-realization. it is limitless precisely because the substantive universality of 
pure self-recognition permeates the singularity of the singular qua already permeated. 
The universal perpetually remains itself whilst simultaneously intensifying and deepen-
ing itself through the particular. The particular is not given in terms of an agency that 
might activate a reflective distance and determination of aims to be realized. in its other 
spirit does not detect a loss of itself or some resistance that it must overcome. rather, 
it finds itself as always already there. as the substance of spirit pure self-recognition is 
a universal, all encompassing and objective condition that is irresistible, infinite life. 
hegel also refers to it as the ‘free power’ that ‘could also be called free love and bound-
less blessedness’ since ‘it is itself and takes its other within its embrace, but without doing 
violence to it; on the contrary, the universal is, in its other, in peaceful communion with 
itself ’ (sl 603). 
so, this objective embracing and permeating universal is the truth of the particular. 
We can say further that the truth of the particular is that it is already gathered with 
other particulars qua gathered in the already achieved permeating and embracing that 
the universal is as the ‘free power’ of gathering as such.10 This plurality of particulars 
is necessary in order for the universal not to exhaust itself in the single particular and 
thereby compromise its universality. at the same time such gathering is not to be un-
derstood in terms of some instrumental value or strategic relation between particulars. 
as the power to gather particulars qua already gathered, the substantive universal is 
immediate communal being populated by communal singularities. The universal has 
its being in and as this communality. The substantive communality of this kind of be-
ing lays in the fact that it has already claimed particulars, beyond all their concrete 
specificities, as belonging to it unconditionally. from the standpoint of this radical com-
munality particulars are unconditionally claimed by the communally embracing and 
permeating universal. Moreover, it is only within the being of each particular qua the 
purely claimed that specificities, such as personal biographies, become meaningful. let 
us proceed to re-conceptualize the idea of pure self-recognition in these more concrete 
existential terms. 
Pure Self-recognition, Communal Being and the Source of  Speculative Thinking
invoking what he calls a ‘community of minds’ (ps ¶ 69), hegel is the thinker of 
     10. on the significance of gathering for hegel’s absolute see george vassilacopoulos, ‘gathering and 
dispersing: The absolute spirit in hegel’s philosophy’, this collection.
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communality as such in the dual sense of thinking about communality whilst also be-
ing the thinking of  communality. here, communality is understood as the immanently 
thinkable and, hence, the absolute object. hegel is, therefore, the situated and commit-
ted thinker in and of the thinkable. This explains his preoccupation with manifestation 
and the associated mutual informing of form and content that manifestation implies. 
from hegel’s perspective, only the historical emergence of such an immediate and pure-
ly self-referential communal spirit—a spirit that at once is liberated from specific forms 
of manifestation, like faith, custom and so on and is the source of the transformative 
experience associated with the individual’s unconditional immersion in it—is capable 
of supplying the ‘ground and soil of science or knowledge in general’ (rh 92).11 To put 
the same point differently, only the immediacy and simplicity of communal being’s self-
referentiality can function as the ‘soil’ for the growth of knowledge as such. for, if knowl-
edge is the thinking of universals, the ‘soil’ of this thinking must itself be the universal 
that in its utter simplicity or state of immediacy is substantive or objective communal 
being in the abovementioned sense. 
This said, how is that such a radical reflective standpoint—one directed to the fact 
of dwelling in the being of pure universality as something that belongs to the thinker’s 
own standpoint of reflection—can be dependent upon a universal characterized by im-
mediacy, albeit pure manifestation? in other words, how might this unqualified immedi-
acy immanently transform itself into an absolute object that incorporates reflectiveness? 
such a task obviously relies upon there being immanently to the communal immediacy 
some differentiation that implies a distance or an outside of some sort. Building on he-
gel’s metaphor we could suggest that there must be a seed of some sort operating in the 
ground and soil of pure self-recognition. if we think of the question of the activation of 
speculative thinking in terms of the conditions for the growth of the seed that is to be 
found in the soil of pure self-recognition, then to understand the source of speculative 
thinking is to gain a radical appreciation of the role and character of this seed. let us 
move on then to identify this seed in the light of our analysis so far.
We can begin by noting that the growth of the seed of pure self-recognition would 
amount to the transformation of this immediate universal manifestation of communal-
ity as a whole into a reflective engagement with its immanent thinking. Moreover, this 
latter would consist in the dual aim of articulating the notion of manifestation and 
ultimately achieving manifesting manifestation in this way. in other words, the growth 
of the seed in question would amount to the activation of the form of communal be-
ing that transforms the purely substantive and immediate manifestation of its being 
into the place of dwelling of the thinker and thereby acting as the embrace of thinking 
ultimately posits itself as that which thinking is to embrace. accordingly, we should ask 
what it would mean for the immediate and universal embracing of communal being to 
become the absolute object of an immanently posited thinking. Because the universal as 
     11. on these specific forms of manifestation see g. W. f. hegel, Reason in History: A General Introduction to 
the Philosophy of  History, trans. hartman robert s., new york, liberal arts press, 1953, p. 92 (henceforth 
rh).
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such can only be embraced by its notion, in so far as it is possible to supply this notion 
it would need to be supplied by what belongs to the universal unconditionally and yet 
is also differentiated from it. The universal would therefore have to differentiate itself 
from itself by treating its being as self-absence as well. it is manifestation that has yet to 
manifest itself and so is absent in its manifesting. Moreover, in so far as this self-presence 
is affirmed as already immediately realized in the universal’s encounter of itself in the 
particular—in that it already permeates the particular—the particular must also be 
capable of functioning as the topos of the universal’s absence. The universal thus emerges 
and retreats in the particular since it is in the particular that the universal being is af-
firmed whilst its notion, or the thinking of its being, is yet to be activated. 
it follows from the above that as the topos of absencing, the particular must re-
flectively embrace the universal. so it is the particular qua communal singularity that 
combines the experience of the infinite antithesis of pure presence—being—that is also 
absence—notion—and pure absence that is also presence. What is unconditionally 
present in the particular incorporates into itself the positing of itself as the project of 
explicit self-appropriation through the particular. What is already unconditionally pres-
ent yet immediately pure owes its presence to its pure power to be. Moreover, thanks to 
its purity this power must be retrieved and exercised reflectively through the particu-
lar simply because it is there. communal being must retrieve its power to be what it 
already is or, in other words, it must retrieve itself as a project. in this inter-relation of 
the universal and the particular we can discern a certain movement. The universality 
of immediate communality releases the particular from itself as that which belongs to 
it unconditionally and it re-claims it by calling upon it to affirm that its unconditional 
belonging also belongs to its own particular being. in other words it calls upon the par-
ticular to become a thinker in order to think the universal.
Without destroying itself then the universal must release the particular and it does 
so by releasing the particular qua ego since this is the infinitely singular and hence the 
other of the universal. as the pure thinking of the pure universal the particular ego in-
finitely expands itself in order to embrace the universality of communal being with the 
result that manifestation thereby manifests itself. precisely because what is purely singu-
lar is also permeated by the purely universal such permeation releases singularity to be 
the infinite power of an infinite expansion capable of embracing and dwelling in what 
initially permeates it thereby acting as the universal’s topos of dwelling. infinite passivity 
thus proves itself to be infinite freedom as well. here we have the speculative mystery of 
the infinitely expanding and infinitely contracting communal ego. The truth of the ego 
is that it is living, that is, pulsating. such releasing of the free ego transforms passive im-
mersion in substantial communality into the active and visionary dwelling of a thinker. 
for hegel then in providing the thinking that the immediate universality of the pure 
manifestation of communal being requires, consciousness is ‘the universal which has as 
its content likewise the universal’, since the being of consciousness is ‘to be as a universal 
within the universal’. To put the same point in more dramatic terms, as a result of dwell-
ing in the universal before the individual activates his thinking, ‘in his particularity [he] 
cosMos and hisTory94
has the vision of himself as universal’ (ilhp 164, 172). here hegel’s spinozism informs 
the fundamental precondition of his philosophy: 
when man begins to philosophize, the soul must commence by bathing in this 
ether of the one substance, in which all that man has held as true has disappeared; 
this negation of all that is particular, to which every philosopher must have come, 
is the liberation of the mind and its absolute foundation (lhp iii 257-258). 
so on our reading when hegel makes the point that the beginning of philosophy presup-
poses that consciousness should dwell in the element of the ‘aether as such’ of pure self-
recognition, he is invoking this link between the immediacy of the pure manifestation 
of communal being and the demand to think it in the above sense. as the thinking of 
the universal, philosophy presupposes the dwelling of the thinker in the universal. still, 
since thinking is initially encountered as a project, as we noted above, the substantive 
universal qua what-is-to-be-thought must be encountered as an absence that permeates 
the being of the thinker. pure self-recognition is precisely this absence of the universal as 
manifesting manifestation that both belongs to the universal and is manifested in what is 
objectively embraced and permeated by the substantive universal, namely the being of 
the particular. This is manifested manifestation as a project to be realized. The dwelling 
of consciousness in the absence of the universal that unconditionally fills consciousness’ 
being is thus the precondition of speculative philosophy that is itself understood as the 
thinking of the universal or manifestation as such. We can conclude that it is the dwell-
ing of consciousness in the terms indicated by the above analysis that supplies the seed 
for the growth of science. 
iii. ModerniTy and speculaTive philosophy
let us now consider in some detail the precise way in which the activation and 
completion of speculative philosophy depend upon the situating of consciousness in the 
substantive oneness of pure self-recognition that we mentioned in the previous section. 
To this end we will sketch the outlines of a speculative theory of modernity since hegel 
attributes the experience of unqualified, pure communality to western modernity. 
The New World Order of  Atomic Individuality
hegel famously relates his own era to the ‘sunburst which, in one flash, illuminates 
the features of the new world’ (ps ¶ 11). in what is likely to be an allusion to the french 
revolution, this reference to an eruption of sorts announces the arrival in the existing 
world order of something radically new. in the fullness of its radicality this announce-
ment indicates liberation. The emerging new world, the new form of spirit, is both 
liberated, in so far as it emerges from the given order, and the process of liberation from 
the given order, in so far as it engages in ‘dissolving bit by bit the structure of its previous 
world’ (ps ¶ 11). 
how might we understand the relationship between speculative philosophy and this 
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complex process of generating historical novelty? To begin with, if we follow hegel’s 
insistence that spirit is communal manifestation we can read the old world in terms of 
a communal being that is determined by specific forms of communal gathering, such as 
faith, tradition and so on, that hegel refers to as ‘immediate (simple and unreflective) 
existence’. now let us suppose that within this world a newly oriented spiritual mani-
festation emerges and effectively challenges the old by putting into question the very 
principle of this form of unreflective communal gathering. The emerging of the new 
must be integrally linked with the collapsing of the old. if unreflective communal being 
is the power to gather individuals qua already gathered into specific forms of gathering, 
its collapsing amounts to their release. 
Moreover, in their new capacity of having been released from hitherto forms of un-
reflective communal being the individuals in question are constituted as having turned 
against the old world. What might such ‘liberated individuals’ be like? Thinking in pure-
ly negative terms we can understand this individuality in its opposition to the gathering 
of unreflective communal beings. here is the rather bleak picture that hegel draws:
Therewith appears the isolation of the individuals from each other and the whole, 
their aggressive selfishness and vanity, their seeking of advantage and satisfaction 
at the expense of the whole. for the inward principle of such isolation (not only 
produces the content but) the form of subjectivity—selfishness and corruption in 
the unbound passions and egotistic interests of men (rh 92).
so the liberated individuals experience their being as atomic whereas their collectivity 
presents in the terms of dispersal. They immerse themselves in their singularity that 
in turn releases their ‘unbound passions and egotistic interests’ given that it is unable 
to expand and become the topos of dwelling of communality. individuals thus lose the 
power to experience their communal being so much so that the norm is to inter-relate 
instrumentally. The dispersal of their collective being implicates their atomic individual-
ity in a way that renders the latter seemingly primordial and irreducible. so for hegel 
atomic individuality results from the ‘violent diremption of mind or spirit into different 
selves which are […] in and for themselves and for one another, are independent, abso-
lutely impenetrable, resistant’ (epM § 436 a). Moreover, hegel links this ‘impenetrable, 
atomic individuality’ with the being of ‘the person’ that he takes to be ‘the practical, 
objective notion, in and for itself ’ (sl 824). 
accordingly, the dispersal of immediate communal being into the form of person-
ality informs and determines the re-groupings that can proceed as an outcome of the 
interaction of self-interested subjects. hobbes is perhaps the first thinker to attempt to 
make sense of this historically novel situation. he is optimistic because he thinks that, 
despite their unbound dispersion, the dwellers in the state of nature can come to master 
their lives when they institute the political state—when they create artificial form out of 
the formlessness of their situation of total war—purely on the basis of enlightened self-
interest. yet for hegel, the speculative significance of personality lies in the connection 
between this impenetrable atomic individuality and its ‘real’ or concrete expression, 
namely property ownership (pr § 34-40). let us consider this connection for a mo-
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ment.
from the discussion so far it follows that once liberated from the manifestation of 
specific forms of communal being, the locus of manifestation becomes the individual 
himself or herself. consequently, personality, the form of atomic individuality, deter-
mines this manifestation. Because manifestation involves the agency of personality that 
refers to the singularity of the ego, and this singularity in turn presents as exclusively 
atomic individuality, the person’s freedom is not infinite despite being the bearer of 
manifestation. although self-relating and thus manifesting (free) to this extent, the per-
son cannot also expand infinitely qua thinking being (in the sense analyzed in the previ-
ous section) in order thereby to activate the notion of manifestation. in this case mani-
festation is to some extent contained and determined by singularity. We might say that 
the person sinks into himself and, rather than dwelling in the expansive way we analyzed 
earlier, the person is instead posited as free-floating. accordingly, despite being the site 
of the notion, the atomic individual does not engage his or her speculative subjectivity 
in so far as he or she does not act as thinking. 
This said, the immediate manifestation of personality does not drown itself so to 
speak in its immediacy; it is not immobile but is already a kind of movement that in-
corporates otherness precisely because it is atomic. in being atomic, personality is not 
oriented to the thinking of being but to an immediate unity whose being is devoid of 
thinking. consequently, the only available option here is to direct itself to a non-resis-
tant entity whose being is penetrable. in this case, the subject immediately occupies the 
being in question and thereby appropriates it as its own essence by emerging through it. 
here, of course, we are invoking the hegelian ‘thing’ that mediates the person’s relation 
to property (pr § 41-71). This is the relation through which the subject’s will acquires its 
being immediately qua occupier of the being of the thing or property owner and thus 
manifests as immediate atomic individuality. it follows from this association of person-
ality with the property-owning relation that the abovementioned dispersal of atomic 
individuals refers to the dispersal of individuals qua property-owning beings. 
so far we have suggested, firstly, that atomic individuality negates the old world of 
unreflective communal being and the specific forms of communality that determine it; 
and, secondly, that this negating is activated by the historical emerging of the atomic 
individual qua property owner. now from a speculative standpoint, the negating of the 
world of unreflective communal being cannot be restricted to the forms of communal-
ity being destroyed; it must also implicate the very principle of communality as such. 
rather than simply opposing itself to one form of communality that fails to recognize 
the reflective element of individuality, the negating activity of property-owning atomic 
individuality is due to its power to appropriate individuality as exclusively atomic. even 
though historically it arises out of the destruction of traditional forms of communal be-
ing, atomic individuality liberates itself by turning against the individuality manifested 
in terms other than those exclusively dictated by its property-owning being. in other 
words atomic individuality radicalizes its atomic being by negating communal individu-
ality as such.
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Speculative Being as the Universality of  Property-Owning Atomic Individuality
next we want to argue that this radical negating accords with a more expansive 
understanding of individuality. let us begin by noting that hegel’s abovementioned ref-
erences to atomic individuality also refer to a further dimension, namely the universal. 
for hegel, individuals are in the contradictory relation of being ‘impenetrable’ and ‘at 
the same time identical with one another, hence not independent, not impenetrable, 
but, as it were, fused with another’ (epM § 436 a). similarly, the person is ‘none the 
less, […] not exclusive individuality, but explicitly universality and cognition, and in its 
other has its own objectivity for its object’ (sl 824). it is this relation between the atomic 
individual and the universal that hegel characterizes as ‘thoroughly speculative’ (epM 
§ 436 a) and giving rise to spirit that is reason or the mutual embracing of subject and 
object as the ultimate act of manifesting manifestation. in other words, the truth of the 
atomic individuality of personality is to be thinking and qua thinking the individual 
must have the universal for his or her object. 
now if it is true that fully conceptualized the person is a speculative being in so far 
as personality, firstly, is atomic or singular individuality that thinks and, secondly, qua 
thinking expands itself to embrace the universality of communal being as its object then, 
according to our analysis, it also follows that in so far as he or she experiences the specu-
lative, the person is already embraced by this object as the universal that incorporates 
within itself the power to be thought. as we argued in the previous section, in permeat-
ing and embracing the person, communal being also calls upon or commands him or 
her to think it. To think communal being is to reconstruct the immediate gathering of 
communal being as such in a manner that incorporates the mediating element of reflec-
tion. in this mutual informing of knowing and known what takes place is the speculative 
appropriation of both the unreflective communal gathering of the old world and the dis-
persal of atomic individuals that negates this communality. in this way communal being 
is liberated from the limitations of particular forms of communal manifestation in order to 
reappear as pure universality—communal being as such—whereas atomic individuality 
is expanded to serve as the universality of  thinking. 
in the light of the above analysis of speculative or communal personality, how can 
we make concrete sense of the emergence of communal personality in the new world 
of atomic individuality and its relationship to the negation that radicalizes the later? 
in creating its world, atomic individuality repeatedly releases instances of speculative 
communality whose cumulative effect is absolutely to undermine them as realizable 
enactments of an alternative world. each instance of actual negation affirms the radi-
cal negating power of atomic individuality. a number of important observations follow 
from this. first, to recall our analysis so far, speculative communality is manifesting 
manifestation since, by incorporating reflective or thinking individuality it incorporates 
the very idea of manifestation. conversely, in so far as it excludes communal individual-
ity atomic individuality excludes the very idea of manifestation. yet despite depending 
on the mediation of the thing, atomic individuality is still manifestation. it follows that 
atomic individuality is manifestation that excludes the very idea of manifestation. in 
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fact the immediacy that the atomic self-relation exhibits in the property-owning identity 
is mediated by this act of emptying the speculative out of itself. This act of emptying 
out is already and, in principle, incorporated in the property owner’s appropriation of 
individuality as exclusively atomic. hegel refers to this as the ‘pure formalism’ that char-
acterizes the subjectivity of the modern world.12
second, what exactly is the speculative significance of the radicalization of atomic 
individuality that, as we argued above, is achieved through the negation of speculative 
or communal personality? Why not think the reverse, namely that in order to pro-
duce the radical result of pure manifesting manifestation it is communal personality 
that must negate individuality qua exclusively atomic? here is a possible speculative 
response. if spirit, being the unconditional manifesting manifestation of communality, 
fully and explicitly engages with itself when, for historical reasons, its notion becomes 
available through the reflective agency of communal personality, then as this inaugural 
engagement it both announces itself as a vision to be realized and, precisely because 
it is visionary, it also announces its retreat in its vision as the not-yet. Being visionary 
as pure manifestation, spirit’s mode of being is pure negation, the ‘not’ as such. in the 
absence of spirit’s explicit engagement with its ‘not’ spirit would be determined by its 
self-relation understood in the purely positive terms of a given. now spirit’s retreat as 
visionary and its corresponding release as its own negation is nothing short of the release 
of atomic individuality. The radicalization of atomic individuality through the negation 
of communal personality is the negation, and hence the radicalization in the abovemen-
tioned sense, that spirit itself is qua visionary. 
The Vision of  Communal Personality and the Retreat of  Spirit
it follows from the above that the vision of communal personality is itself the nega-
tion of atomic individuality. if spirit is self-negating because it is visionary then it also 
negates its negation for the same reason. in doing so it transforms the latter into the 
process leading to the realization of the vision. We can now appreciate hegel’s reference 
to the ‘sunburst which, in one flash, illuminates the features of the new world.’ in its 
totality the ‘new world’ is the vision that announces both the ideal of communal being 
as an ideal to be realized and its corresponding retreat. 
historically, this dual act of negating is rendered explicit through the mutual inform-
ing of political revolution and speculative philosophy. The revolution offers a visionary 
announcement of the project of communal being (or freedom in solidarity) pointing 
beyond the world of property-owning atomic individuality. The retreat or failure of the 
revolution expresses the first instance of spirit’s self-negation. yet this retreat proves to 
     12. lhp i p. 152. hegel incorporates the unreflective communal bond as superseded and hence preserves 
it as superseded in his account of civil society, the sphere of atomic individuality, by presenting the immediate 
loving unity of the family as an individual property-owning unit. so too the reflective bond of solidarity 
that determines the ethical life of the ‘corporations’ is preserved as superseded in so far as it is confined to 
a limited social space rather than acting as a world-determining principle and this expresses the emptying 
out of speculative individuality that we discussed above. 
Toula nicolacopoulos and george vassilacopoulos 99
be unconditional. ultimately, spirit retreats in its retreat, thus transforming the space 
that the retreat is into the topos of a more radical encounter with itself. at the same time, 
in retreating unconditionally spirit emerges as an absolute arrival, the arriving as such. 
With the first retreat by emptying itself out of the mutual informing of notion and be-
ing that revolutionary communal being takes for granted spirit prepares the ground for 
addressing itself on a more fundamental level. With the second by positing itself as the 
source of the whole speculative problematic concerning the inter-relation of thinking 
and being it liberates itself from the effects of the first retreat. 
consequently, the vision that is negated as a political project becomes the absolute 
vision—in the sense of visionary vision or the vision of vision—that, unlike the opposi-
tional posture of revolution, incorporates the totality of the world of atomic individual-
ity that negates it with the effect of negating the negation. here, failure is speculatively 
transformed into a new and far more radical announcement of spirit’s arrival by com-
parison with its political arrival. This arrival of spirit is absolute precisely because it 
emerges out of retreat. after all, the retreat of political revolution is not co-extensive 
with the defeat of the vision of communal being. in this case the critical question does 
not merely concern the realization of the vision but its very meaning and, by extension, 
the very meaning of the world as the agent that re-produces itself in a visionary manner. 
in the present context, there is a sense in which vision becomes more significant than 
reality itself.
Spirit’s Retreat into the Infinitely Expanding Ego
now the question remains as to the nature and locus of spirit’s unconditional retreat. 
if by retreating from the concrete world of property-owning atomic individuality spirit’s 
communal being lands not in some foreign place but in its own topos then it lands at the 
site of its encounter with its pure notion, the very idea of spirit, as an infinite possibility. 
This point is crucial for understanding the depth of spirit’s dwelling if it is to encounter 
itself in a way that gives rise to speculative philosophy. note, firstly, that spirit does not 
encounter its notion as a given. its topos of dwelling does not act as a mirror that imme-
diately reflects an image of itself from which to begin the process of its development. as 
we have suggested, spirit already finds itself beyond the limits of the revolution. at the 
same time, however, it is only by encountering its notion that spirit encounters itself. 
how might these two demands that spirit’s radicality poses be simultaneously satisfied? 
since spirit retreats in its retreat without losing itself, it encounters itself as that out of 
which even its very notion, that of manifesting manifestation, must become an issue. 
so, in retreating in its retreat spirit has the vision of its notion as what must become in 
the dual sense of becoming both the vision that it is and that to which the vision gives 
expression. as a vision that renders the very meaning of vision—and hence the very 
meaning of emerging and realizing—an issue, spirit is not-yet in this radical sense. 
This is the form that spirit’s second retreat takes through which it deals with the vision 
qua vision. Basically this means that spirit deals with itself as the movement from self-
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givenness to free self-appropriation at the fundamental level of its inaugural encounter 
with itself. More specifically, because spirit is ‘not’ it is absolutely passive with respect 
to itself and thereby encounters itself thanks to already being infinitely permeated by its 
notion. yet it is also the power freely to embrace its visionary notion as a precondition 
for the notion’s realization. 
now, if it is true that by retreating in its retreat spirit encounters its notion, then 
spirit must associate itself with that aspect of its being that concerns the supply of its no-
tion. according to our earlier analysis, the locus of this reflective moment is the commu-
nal person’s dwelling in spirit’s communal being. as immediately and unconditionally 
embracing and permeating communal singularities, spirit encounters itself in visionary 
terms as a project to be realized. The site of this encounter is communal singularity in 
its capacity as the power to think and consequently as the bearer of the notion of the 
universality of communal being. precisely for this reason whereas the political retreat 
of communal being is a collective affair, spirit’s retreat in its retreat can, and need, only 
take place in a single individual. The political retreat empties the singular communal 
person of the substantive universal communal being’s immediate permeating. That is, 
communal singularity loses sight of its historical mission as a visionary participant in the 
visionary gathering in communal being as a visionary world-making force. But since it 
is the communal person qua gathered that provides the gathering with its very notion—
and hence with the topos of its gathering as gathering—the already realized retreat of the 
gathering from the world takes place as retreat in the agent capable of supplying the no-
tion to begin with, that is, in the singularity of the infinitely expanding ego. 
The ego thus dwells in the retreat of the retreat that occurs within its own field 
of awareness as this awareness. That which permeates and embraces the ego retreats 
unconditionally as this permeating. in doing so, it posits the ego as the already perme-
ated. like the original permeation of communal being, this retreat is no less substantive, 
objective and universal. in other words the ego cannot resist the universal’s emptiness 
within itself that the retreating communal ‘we’ activates. Through the retreat because it 
is already the topos of dwelling of the gathering qua gathered, the ego is posited as this 
topos as such. in other words, the ego is posited as immediate pure manifestation or what 
hegel calls ‘pure self-recognition’—this infinite emptiness that the ego is substantively—
made explicit by the retreating ‘we’. This is the substantive universal as such within the 
ego in whose infinite emptiness the ego finds itself dwelling. 
still, precisely because it dwells in the universal in this radical sense, the ego can-
not but encounter in its own self the universal that demands that it be thought. in other 
words, the pure universal already claims the ego as a thinker and, accordingly, the 
thinker already provides the universal with the vision of its notion that is at once the 
very notion of the vision. dwelling in this manner, the thinker is already open to the 
manifestation of this immediate universality that is encountered as the command to 
think. pure self-recognition is activated as a command by this reception of the thinker’s 
dwelling, whereas, as this receiving, the thinker is posited as capable of speculative 
thinking. even so, because pure self-recognition and the dwelling of consciousness are 
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both moments of spirit, in their mutual inter-relation spirit emerges as the absolute 
creator of the mutual informing of notion and being. spirit is both the absolute com-
mand and its reception. as such it is the agent that posits the vision of the speculative 
notion as the originating act of conceptuality. it is in this sense the topos from which pure 
conceptuality is to be activated. This is the primordial freedom of spirit, or the ‘god who 
impels to self-knowledge’ by activating both the absolute commandment ‘know thyself ’ 
and its very reception (epM § 377, a). 
now if spirit’s command is manifested in so far as the thinker receives it, what is 
the primordial manifestation of the thinker as this receiving and, relatedly, what is the 
primordial manifestation of the command itself? as this receiving, the infinite singular-
ity of the ego is transformed into an infinite expanding that, as we have already noted, 
must embrace the empty or pure universality activated by the retreating communal be-
ing that embraces it. indeed, in its most elementary and radically empty expression, the 
ego takes the form of the thinker qua singular ‘i’ who utters the ‘we’. hegel’s entire phi-
losophy can be understood as an exploration of the very idea of the ‘i-we’, the thinker’s 
vision of being a universal. from the outset then the thinker emerges as this uttering in 
whose emptiness all ‘that man has held true has disappeared’ and out of which empti-
ness must spring the speculative idea of the world as thinkable (lhp iii 258). it follows 
that one cannot philosophize speculatively in the absence of saying ‘we’ both prior to 
the activation of the project and throughout its realization. 
We turn next to argue that in keeping with the demands of a presuppositionless 
science the idea of the world as thinkable must be available to science as an indispens-
able aspect of the very emerging of visionary science. indeed on our reading the idea 
of the world’s thinkability and consequent openness to speculative thinking is the pre-
condition of science in that it defines the ‘absolute otherness’ that is no less an integral 
part of spirit’s retreat into pure conceptuality. (recall that for hegel the precondition 
of science is consciousness’ dwelling in the element of ‘pure self-recognition in absolute 
otherness’.)
iv. aBsoluTe oTherness and The ideas of hisTory and naTure
in the previous section we argued that spirit’s self-negation takes place in the world 
of property-owning atomic individuality. The formal subject that ‘has made itself to 
be empty’ of the speculative inter-relation of thinking and being is none other than 
property-owning subjectivity. spirit’s moment of ‘absolute otherness’ is constituted as 
the world of property owners, this emptying out of the very notion of the speculative. 
The emptying out in question is absolute since it incorporates being and thinking as 
forms of the emptying/emptied out inter-relation. in other words, in one and the same 
act it is being that empties itself of the notion and as this emptying out it is also being 
that is emptied from the notion since what it empties is its own notion. accordingly, the 
site of otherness is not being as the other of the notion but being itself. here, the notion 
is transformed into the notion of otherness and being is transformed into the being of 
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otherness. in their mutual informing the notion and being of otherness constitute the 
realm of ‘absolute otherness’ that is the ‘othering’ in otherness itself. 
More specifically, on the one hand, in emptying itself from being the notion empties 
itself as notion and thereby transforms itself into its other, or rather, into the very idea of 
otherness. here, it is the notionless notion. consequently, it empties itself from the specu-
lative element of reflection that in the previous sections we associated with the power of 
the ego to expand infinitely. as this emptying the notion remains implicit and the self is 
posited as atomic. at the same time, the implicitness of the notion is expressed only in 
that which is already external to itself—the thing—and, hence, unable immanently to 
accommodate the element of thinking. in being other to itself in this case, being is the 
being of otherness. it is beingless and therefore also notionless being. it follows that the 
immediate unity of the notion of otherness, constituted as the atomic self, and the being 
of otherness, constituted as the thing, give rise to the property-owning relation in terms 
of the absolute otherness of the speculative as speculative otherness. 
now, in accordance with our line of argument, the concrete world of absolute other-
ness mediates the vision of the pure notion of science that relates to the thinker’s receiv-
ing of the command to think through the thinker’s dwelling in pure self-recognition. al-
though pure self-recognition is the very idea of spirit in its immediacy, its purity results 
from the speculative emptying out that constitutes atomic individuality. This added di-
mension raises the question of the connection between the thinker’s visionary being and 
his or her concrete participation in the world of property-owning atomic individuality. 
To put the same question differently, what is the significance for the property-owning 
world of the fact that the vision of the infinite expansion and embracing of speculative 
thinking also claims the atomic being of the particular person? These questions turn 
our attention to the relationship between the vision of speculative thinking that we have 
been elaborating and the possibility of speculatively thinking the world. 
The Absolute Otherness of  the Property-Owning World and History as its Thinkability
We can begin to address this issue by noting that the very emergence of the vision 
of science treats the thinkability of the world as its essence and the world as excluding 
science qua the idea of the thinkable—pure self-recognition—and the idea of the think-
ing of the thinkable. precisely because, as absolute otherness the property-owning world 
actively empties itself out of the speculative moment, to the emptied out speculative no-
tion it reveals itself to be the power of the notion’s release. it also renders explicit that its 
act of emptying out is the topos in and out of which the vision of the notion emerges. in 
other words, the notion of pure thinking that is in a sense exiled from the world is the 
worlds’ own notion and hence its topos of exile is the world itself as a whole. it is in this 
sense that hegel invokes ‘pure self-recognition in absolute otherness’.
now precisely because the world acts in this radically immanent manner in releas-
ing the very notion of thinking the thinkable, the world also releases its power to be 
the being of thinkability. consequently, the self-mediation of the world that releases its 
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notion qua notion of the thinkable and its thinking posits the world as the in-itself think-
able. The world is the in-itself-for-the-notion. speculatively speaking everything in the 
whole of the property-owning world is gathered in this, and as this, all-inclusive empty-
ing out that explicitly and reflectively happens as what is already the case in the purely 
conceptual emergence of the notion that belongs to it exclusively, albeit negatively. 
accordingly, science is the retreating world as this retreating, that is, it is the very 
idea of thinkability emerging in the thinkable world that is empty of its idea. Mediated 
by the infinite separation of being and thinking the release of the philosophical moment 
marks the retreat of being into the darkness of its own amnesia, the amnesia of the 
thinkable. The remembering of the notion that the vision of science is takes place in the 
realm of its division from being that the forgetting of the world of absolute otherness is. 
speculative philosophy is thus the form of emerging of spirit as this (di)vision.
To be sure, the implicitness of the world’s thinkability directly relates to the absolute-
ness of spirit. if the world is unconditionally thinkable then even its own thinkability 
must be activated out of itself. The world must be the power to know what it is, not by 
encountering its essence as a given, but by retreating in its essence in order to make 
knowledge of it a goal to be realized and by surviving this retreat. That is why at the end 
of the speculative project of thinking the world—hegel’s system—the notion reveals 
that the forgetting of the world is history understood as the urge and the power of the 
thinkable actually and explicitly to become thinkable in-and-for-itself. The vision of the 
notion as the unconditionally thinkable is already the unconscious vision of the world. 
But if the above reading is correct, then in having the vision of the notion as the no-
tion of the purely thinkable the thinker must also have the vision of the idea of history. 
in other words, the thinker must be in a position to acknowledge the mediating role of 
absolute otherness in terms of the idea of the world being the urge towards becoming 
thinkable. it follows that from the very beginning the vision of the notion of pure think-
ability must also be accompanied by the vision of history as such, or spirit’s release of 
itself in time through its retreat. if this is the case, then the world of absolute otherness, 
the global gathering of property-owning persons, is constituted as nothing other than 
history itself. here we are not referring to some historical stage to be followed by an 
other, but to the ‘not yet’ of the implicit thinkability. This vision of the idea of history 
renders the world of absolute otherness as one aspect of spirit’s being from the first mo-
ment of the emergence of science. 
ultimately this truth of the world must be revealed with the activation of speculative 
thinking. Being the idea of the thinkable itself (the absolute object), science qua vision 
expresses the idea of spirit as a whole (manifesting manifestation), that is, the idea of 
the thinkable-thinking-thought that is fully worked out in the Science of  Logic. When this 
comprehensive standpoint of the notion is extended to the thinkable world, the world of 
absolute otherness emerges as only one moment in the full landscape of the world spirit. 
indeed, it is revealed to be the teleological drive from which being emerges as actually 
(in and for itself) thinkable, that is, as explicitly releasing the mutual explicit embracing 
of being and notion (realized reason). in hegel’s system, this being-notion relation is 
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concretely articulated as the idea of the ethical state. on our analysis, this state refers 
to the (yet to be) realized spirit that is perpetually produced by the global gathering of 
ethical agents who respond to the command to be as a world absolutely, a command that 
is itself activated by the (yet to be) ‘achieved community of minds’.13 
Absolute Otherness as the Dwelling of  Visionary Spirit in Nature
We have been arguing that the idea of history must be part of science’s primordial 
vision but when hegel discusses absolute knowing at the end of the Phenomenology and 
before the activation of the speculative project he also appeals to nature. like the idea 
of history, the idea of nature is an integral part of the original vision. Whereas the idea 
of history invokes spirit’s realization as thinkable, the idea of nature invokes the very 
emergence of spirit as purely and perpetually visionary. 
The notion’s vision of the mutual informing of subject and object—in terms of the 
commanding (thinkable), receiving (thinking) and realizing (thought) mentioned earli-
er—also gives rise to the idea of the perpetual vision as such. in other words, the execu-
     13. ps ¶ 69. from the above analysis it follows that the received interpretations of the ethical state in 
terms of the division between civil society and the political state do not take account of the speculative 
requirements operating in hegel’s Philosophy of  Right. see, for example, klaus hartmann, ‘Towards and 
new systematic reading of hegel’s philosophy of right’, in in Z.a. pelczynski (ed.), The State and Civil 
Society: Studies in Hegel’s Political Philosophy, cambridge, cambridge university press, 1984, pp. 114-136; k-h 
ilting, ‘The dialectic of civil society’, in Z.a. pelczynski (ed.), The State and Civil Society, pp. 211-226. on 
the contrary, the concept of society is one aspect of the realm of absolute otherness whereas that of the 
ethical state is the speculative vision of communal being that will be released—as the vision that explicitly 
incorporates the power for its realization—out of the collapse of the global world of absolute otherness. 
The sovereign political state is another aspect of absolute otherness within which the institutions of civil 
society can be said to gather. accordingly, modern liberal institutions, like those that hegel elaborates in 
his discussion on civil society, express part of the form of absolute otherness created out of the gathering 
of property owners. These institutions are in principle global given the formality characterizing the being 
of personality. yet, they ultimately emerge within the limited framework of the particular political state 
since the gathering of persons also constitutes the negation of the very idea of the global communality to 
come, a communality that comprehensively expresses the very idea of world spirit from the speculative 
standpoint. (This negation, as we have already argued, results from the emptying out of the speculative 
moment constituted as the property-owning world.) on this analysis, today’s global gathering of property 
owners perpetuates itself through the negation of its own future. That is, in so far as it takes its own being 
to be global the gathering of property owners negates the notion and being of communal globality. as this 
negation the property-owning world is also posited as the dispersal of particulars that results from the denial 
of the future understood in terms of the speculative universal of communally integrated being in which 
every form of the particular is also a form of embracing the universal. so the current drive to create global 
institutions is compromised by the equally decisive drive to negate the very idea of the global in the future. 
as a result the current reality is that of the dispersal of self-grounding or sovereign particular political states 
constituted as the international community. The inability of the particulars in question to be informed 
by the universal is reflected in an ultimately unenforceable international law. so, whereas civil society’s 
economic and legal institutions result from the affirmation of the present of property owners, the sovereign 
political state results from the denial of the future. still, since that which is denied belongs to that which 
acts as the power of denying, the world of absolute otherness denies itself through the mediation of what it 
denies and thus denies itself as denying. if we understand history as the end result of this infinite or absolute 
denying, history must be the release of what it already is and, as we have argued, it is the thinkable.
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tion of the command does not mean that the command and its reception are forgotten. 
precisely because what is commanded by the command (the realization of the thinkable 
as thinkable) is immanently realized, in this capacity it perpetually retrieves the com-
mand as its own, thus perpetually positing itself as realizable and hence as visionary. 
This is because spirit is both the source of the command and its reception, something 
that science qua vision must render explicit in its very emerging pursuant to the mutual 
informing of its beginning and end. if this is correct then in its notion spirit’s perpetual 
visionary state is revealed as realized and consequently it is also retrieved as realizable. 
The movement in question is akin to perpetually encountering oneself for the first time 
in order to realize oneself and the effect is an intensification of what has already been 
realized. The being of fully realized spirit is perpetually teleological in this sense. 
how is this primordial and perpetual release of the visionary spirit, a release that 
belongs to spirit itself, possible? it must be the case that the principle of spirit’s self-
relating—spirit’s infinite immersion in, and emergence from, itself—emerges from 
spirit’s infinite outsideness. This latter is the realm of nature that hegel calls ‘indiffer-
ent subsistence’.14 spirit’s freedom is infinitely and perpetually visionary in so far as its 
self-awareness is mediated by its emerging from and dwelling in nature or the realm of 
‘externality’. it follows that in so far as the primordial emergence of science relies upon 
the idea of spirit as visionary this emerging is possible only if spirit is informed not only 
by the idea of history but also by the idea of nature. 
so at the end of history—the moment when spirit’s perpetual visionary character 
and its power perpetually to realize its vision become explicit—spirit’s relation to nature 
must take centre stage. history and historical being presuppose spirit’s primordial rela-
tion to nature in this way and it is this relation that is explicitly released with the collapse 
of history. in this way spirit moves beyond the limits of historical being to spiritual be-
ing. We must say that as spiritual beings our primary relation is not with history but with 
nature. The primordial emergence of the gathering of the visionary egos who are in a 
position infinitely to expand with the saying ‘we’ becomes exclusively a matter between 
the ‘community of minds’ and nature. under these conditions it also becomes possible 
collectively to retrieve the experience historically introduced by the greek thinkers who 
‘presupposed nothing but the heaven above and the earth around.’ in hegel’s words, this 
‘feeling that we are all our own is characterized of free thought—of that voyage into the 
open, where nothing is below us or above us, and we stand in solitude with ourselves 
alone’ (el § 31 a).
from the above analysis it follows not only that science is the vision of the pure 
idea of thinking but that it is also the mission to think the world in terms of its self-
realization qua thinkable (as history) through the awareness of spirit’s speculative rela-
tion to nature. This expanded vision makes it possible for science to encounter itself in 
its primordial emerging as this vision and mission and thereby to activate its thinking, 
to undertake each particular stage in its development and immediately move on to the 
     14. g. W. f. hegel, Philosophy of  Nature: Being Part Two of  the Encyclopaedia of  the Philosophical Sciences, 1830, 
trans. M. J. petry, 3 vols., london, george allen & unwin, 1970, § 248.
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next. indeed each stage (and each stage within each stage) is from the outset situated 
in, and mediated by, this panoramic vision. in the light of science’s expanded vision 
the articulation of the idea of the thinkable—the absolute object—is the first task to be 
realized. Moreover, once the purely logical process has been undertaken and situated 
in science’s expanded vision this process leads immediately to a consideration of nature 
as that from which the visionary power of visionary science emerges. Moreover, once 
thinking nature has similarly been elaborated and situated in the expanded vision of 
science, thinking leads to the realm of spirit. so too the realm of spirit must be thought 
in a way that reveals the world as the thinkable whose idea has already been worked 
out in the Science of  Logic. Thus the (development of the) categories of the Logic is the 
thinker’s only guide for conceptualizing spirit in a way that remains true to the primor-
dial speculative vision.15
To summarize, the whole vision and unfolding of the drama of speculative phi-
losophy proceeds as the singularity of the thinker expands to become the universality 
of thinking the notion of thinking, and consequently of thinking the world of spirit as 
the purely thinkable. philosophy is the encountering in one’s singularity of the absolute 
strangeness of the transformation that makes it possible for the ‘i’ to think (or say) ‘we’ 
and hence to function as the house of the ‘we’. still, precisely because thinking happens 
here via its exile from being all that is needed for it to occur is a single individual whose 
infinite philosophical embracing of the ‘we’ remains unpopulated. The happening of 
speculative philosophy is therefore not a collective affair; it always involves the strange-
ness of the expansion of the ‘i’ and the terror associated with the anxiety of the infinite 
absence of the ‘we’ that appears as a shadow in the shadowy realm of the vision that the 
thinker is. This is why throughout the development of the speculative project the voice 
of the thinker is the ‘i’ that repeatedly says ‘we’.16 
having completed our account of the thinker’s dwelling in pure self-recognition in 
absolute otherness, we will proceed to explore the implications of our reading for an 
understanding of role of the phenomenological and logical cycles of justification in the 
activation of speculative philosophy.
     15. see Toula nicolacopoulos and george vassilacopoulos, Hegel and the Logical Structure of  Love: An Essay 
on Sexualities Family and the Law, aldershot, ashgate, 1999.
     16. a fuller articulation of this last point would also tell us something about the origin and the speculative 
significance of language. The very idea of language is activated by the universality of the infinitely 
expanding (thinking) ego that utters the ‘i-we’. The word as such (‘we’) emerges as the topos of dwelling of 
the ‘community of minds’ as a project to be realized. hegel describes this topos as an ‘external community’; 
it is a gathering that is yet to be realized. from this standpoint we can make sense of the poet yannis 
ritsos’s appeal that: ‘every word is an outing/to a gathering, one often cancelled/and this is when a word 
is true: when it insists on the gathering’, our translation from Ρίτσος, Γ., ‘Το νόημα της απλότητας’, 
Γιάννης Ρίτσος Ποιήματα, 1941-1958, Τόμος Β, Αθήνα, Κέδρος, 1979, σ. 453 (y. ritsos, ‘The Meaning of 
simplicity’, Yiannis Ritsosk Poems 1941-1958 Volume B, athens, kedros, 1979, p. 453). indeed the uttering of 
the ‘we’ is also the transformation of the material naturalness of the sign into the topos of emerging of the 
spiritual as vision.
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v. The phenoMenological cycle of JusTificaTion
We have argued above that consciousness’ dwelling in pure self-recognition is char-
acterized by the element of infinite passivity. in this capacity the thinker finds himself 
or herself already situated in this dwelling; he or she is permeated by the objective or 
substantive power of the retreat of immediate communal being. The thinker already ex-
periences the singularity of his or her atomic ego as the possibility of infinite expansion 
(thinking) so that the passivity that determines the finitude of the thinker’s singularity 
is also claimed as infinite freedom. recall that, according to hegel, when immersed in 
pure self-recognition the thinker is posited and preserves himself or herself as ‘absolute 
form’ or ‘the immediate certainty of oneself ’ (ps ¶ 26). Qua absolute form the thinker 
is the exclusive bearer of the vision of speculative thinking. ultimately it is in and as 
this infinite and perpetual preserving of the ego as the vision of its universality that the 
immediate universality of communal being is transformed into the command to know 
or to think. Moreover, as we have argued, the thinker is transformed into the receiving 
of the command and thus into the topos of the command. This is absolutely elementary 
for the emergence of science since ‘science […] requires that self-consciousness should 
have raised itself into this aether in order to be able to live—and [actually] to live—with 
science and in science’ (ps ¶ 26). 
But, of course, there is the other side to this story, that which calls upon science to 
supply the individual qua absolute form with ‘the ladder to this standpoint, should show 
him this standpoint within himself ’ in conformity with the individual’s rightful expecta-
tion (ps ¶ 26). in so far as science claims or embraces the thinker as absolute form—and 
precisely because one is absolute form—the thinker must be in a position to exercise 
one’s freedom by claiming science’s claim upon one as one’s own. When one encounters 
oneself dwelling in pure self-recognition one can authenticate oneself as the thinker that 
one is claimed to be by actively dwelling in one’s dwelling or by freely embracing what 
embraces one in one’s capacity as free and in this way freely embracing one’s own free-
dom. now, if, as we have argued, the universality of pure self-recognition embraces the 
thinker, it acts as absolute object since the thinking it demands does not derive from the 
outside. yet such thinking is itself absolute because its own object does not derive from 
the outside. accordingly, having already been claimed by absolute content, the thinker 
in his or her capacity as absolute form must actively and freely affirm the absoluteness of 
the absolute content of pure self-recognition. paradoxically this means that the thinker 
must demand from science a point of access from which freely to make his or her entry 
so to speak into the topos that makes science possible, that is, the topos in which he or she 
already dwells as a matter of fact. 
This said, satisfaction of the thinker’s demand in the light of his or her absolute 
form presupposes that he or she has access to some content or object other than that 
which science offers (hereafter ‘the thinker’s second object of reflection’). for in the 
absence of the availability of another object the thinker would not be in a position freely 
to claim his or her freedom. What sort of object must this be? To answer this question 
it is worth noting, firstly, that despite dwelling passively and hence immediately in pure 
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self-recognition, taken as a whole the thinker’s position is constituted as a mediated im-
mediacy. This mediation concerns the thinker’s dwelling in spirit’s retreat from the 
world as well as in the world from which spirit has retreated. Before the retreating spirit 
claims the thinker as free, the latter already dwells in the world in which he or she is to 
be re-introduced reflectively, precisely because he or she is claimed by science’s promise 
of speculative thinking. The thinker’s dwelling in pure self-recognition is not only me-
diated by the thinker’s retreat from his or her world; such dwelling itself mediates the 
thinker’s dwelling in the world, a dwelling that is now experienced as the result of re-
treating from science’s speculative reflective standpoint. This reappropriation is an act 
of violence against both science and consciousness’ dwelling in it. Whereas science is 
the vision of conceptualizing the world speculatively, the world presents itself to science 
as already containing the speculative within it in so far as it accommodates conscious-
ness as free or the individual in his or her capacity as absolute form. To put it differently, 
even though the thinker has the vision of the freedom of thinking in science, the world 
presents itself as the actual topos of the freedom of the thinker, his or her natural place 
of dwelling as a thinker. 
secondly, in both cases the source of thinking is the thinker’s own independence or 
absolute form. here we have the activation of a movement from one reflective stand-
point to the other through which each claims to be the truth of the other and each 
takes the truth of the other to have collapsed in its own truth. To emphasize again, 
what makes this possible is that both reflective standpoints—those of science and the 
world—present themselves as the appropriate topos of the free thinker. in embracing the 
thinker as thinker both standpoints call upon the thinker to embrace them. in doing so 
they each claim the form of the speculative as their own. so, the need for the availabil-
ity of a second object relates to the thinker’s resolve to stay where he or she already is, 
namely in the speculative, rather than to the desirability of choice. 
finally, considering whether there is a topos in which the thinker dwells and from 
which he or she must enter science as an affirmation of his or her absolute indepen-
dence in science we can say with hegel that this topos must be the antithesis of sci-
ence. This is the ‘standpoint of consciousness which knows objects in their antithesis 
to itself, and itself in antithesis to them’ (ps ¶ 26). so outside of science, the thinker’s 
second object of reflection is the world defined in terms of consciousness’ dichotomous 
relation(s) to its objects (hereafter ‘the subject-object dichotomy’). for hegel, not only 
does consciousness dwell in this dichotomy as absolute form but also the subject-object 
dichotomy appears to be the only antithesis that can be posited to science. Why should 
this be the case? Bearing in mind that it is the thinker’s dwelling in science that acti-
vates the whole speculative problematic, we can formulate an answer to this question by 
supposing that in so far as science claims the thinker, science must also release him or 
her into its own antithesis as the precondition for freely embracing the resolve to stay with 
it. so, it seems that qua absolute form the thinker has only two places to dwell in and 
determining which of the two is the genuine home of his or her speculative freedom is 
the thinker’s first act of freedom. 
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in the light of our discussion so far two further questions remain regarding our ac-
count of the rationale underpinning a phenomenological justificatory cycle. one ques-
tion relates to the claim that the subject-object dichotomy accommodates consciousness 
in its capacity as absolute form. how is this possible when this latter condition calls for 
an object whose being is informed by, rather than antithetical to, consciousness’ know-
ing? a second question concerns the link between our discussion of the subject-object 
dichotomy and that of property-owning atomic individuality that on our earlier analysis 
constitutes the absolute otherness of pure self-recognition. We will address these two 
questions in reverse order.
We have argued that the vision of the speculative occurs in the absolute otherness 
that is constituted by the property-owning world of atomic individuality. in so far as 
atomic individuality empties itself out of speculative reflection, that is, of the mutual 
informing of subject and object, it is also posited as this emptying. so from the property-
owner’s standpoint reflection offers a form of knowing that consciousness’ absolute form 
incorporates whilst remaining external to the object known. here the source of the sub-
ject-object dichotomy presupposes that the object as such is the property item whereas 
the subject as such manifests immediately as the property-owning atomic individual. 
yet consciousness remains unaware of the mediating role played by the property-
owning atomic individual’s release. consequently it takes itself to be the exclusive source 
of the awareness that determines its relation to the object. ultimately this means that 
consciousness takes the relation of property ownership to be an aspect of the world of the 
subject-object dichotomy. consciousness can do so because the role we have attributed 
here to the property-owning subject is accessible only from the standpoint of science 
that is immanently linked to its absolute other. accordingly, we might say that whereas 
science’s rivalry with its absolute other—property-owning atomic individuality— medi-
ates the competing claims of science and the dichotomously related consciousness, the 
dichotomously related consciousness nevertheless remains unaware of this mediation. 
for this reason both science and its absolute other claim awareness (consciousness) for 
themselves and they both claim it in its capacity as absolute form. 
now from the standpoint of property-owning atomic individuality the challenge is 
to show that although consciousness is dichotomously related to its object of knowledge 
it is not also dichotomously related to the manifestation of the subject-object dichotomy 
itself. rather, this latter functions as a speculative realm of manifestation that is deter-
mined by the external relation of knower and known in which consciousness dwells 
as absolute form in so far as it supplies the very idea of the dichotomy. in other words 
consciousness treats the dichotomy itself as its absolute content. it is in this sense that 
the individual is characterized by ‘absolute independence, which he is conscious of pos-
sessing in every phase of his knowledge’ (ps ¶ 26). We are now also in a position to see 
why hegel suggests that ‘it makes no difference whether we think of science as the 
appearance because it comes on the scene alongside another form of knowledge, or 
whether we call that other untrue knowledge its manifestation’ (ps ¶ 76). since science 
is initially only an appearing, it has yet to incorporate the self-certainty that character-
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izes consciousness in its capacity as absolute form: 
science must […] unite this element of self-certainty with itself, or rather show that 
and how this element belongs to it. so long as science lacks this actual dimension, 
it is only the content as the in-itself, the purpose that is as yet still something 
inward, not yet spirit, but only spiritual substance. This in-itself has to express 
itself outwardly and become for itself, and this means simply that it has to posit 
self-consciousness as one with itself (ps ¶ 26). 
so, when science is not yet ‘in and for itself ’ (ps ¶ 76) how is the indispensable positing 
of self-consciousness’ unity to be realized? What is the process by which science can 
move from merely being the absolute object that embraces the subject to also being 
the corresponding embracing of the subject as absolute form? in other words, how is 
science supposed to ‘turn against’ and ‘liberate’ itself from the other form of knowing 
that likewise claims the speculative standpoint in so far as it claims consciousness as its 
own (ps ¶ 76)? in the light of our earlier analysis we can argue that the required process 
must involve the retreat of what has already retreated. let us explain. recall that on 
our analysis science emerges as spirit’s retreat from the world as a result of the thinker’s 
dwelling in this retreat. at the same time, in so far as he or she dwells in spirit’s retreat 
the thinker has already retreated from his or her world. now in claiming the thinker as 
free science presupposes that the thinker’s retreat is itself an act of freedom in the light 
of the failure of the thinker’s world to accommodate his or her free agency. Because it 
initially appears as mere assertion this claim must be justified. if it is true that the think-
er whom the absolute object claims as absolute form must embrace the absolute object 
himself or herself, to activate this embracing the thinker must begin from the recogni-
tion that this embracing is otherwise absent. it follows that to activate the embracing in 
question the thinker must rely upon his or her reflective state of not embracing. now the 
thinker’s non-embracing relation to the object is expressed in terms of the dichotomous 
inter-relation of the thinker to the object. in this dichotomous relation the thinker has 
already embraced his or her being as one of neither embracing nor being embraced by 
the object. conversely, the thinker embraces and is embraced by the dichotomy and to 
this extent he or she is free or manifests absolute form. 
it follows from the above that to ‘posit self-consciousness as one with itself ’ is to 
have science retrieve the thinker from the world immanently to the thinker rather than 
as a simple given. More specifically, since the thinker must freely embrace his or her 
condition of already dwelling in science, the retrieval in question functions as a process 
of recollecting. The thinker is in a position to recollect the fact of his or her retreat from 
the world into science once the world is shown already to have been unable to accom-
modate the speculative truth of the thinker’s absolute form. 
This sums up the significance of the phenomenological process whereby conscious-
ness purifies itself as science ‘liberates’ itself (ps ¶ 76). This is a fully speculative process 
through which the purely negative gives rise to a positive result. it is constituted by 
consciousness’ multiple failed attempts to dwell in the subject-object dichotomy specu-
latively by thinking this relation. With every failure and collapse of the form of the 
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dichotomy being thought the thinker retreats further into science in order to reactivate 
consciousness’ dwelling in the dichotomy in ever more radical terms. With this process 
of determinate negation the aim of consciousness qua absolute form is to collapse the 
collapsing itself or to complete consciousness’ purificatory process that simultaneously 
amounts to consciousness’ ultimate and free retreat into the freedom of science. The 
retreat in question can be characterized as free since consciousness has only its purified 
absolute form to retreat into following its phenomenological failure to claim its absolute 
form for the world. in other words this failure explicitly posits consciousness as what 
has freely failed. indeed, consciousness does not itself collapse with the collapse of the 
dichotomy only because it carries in itself the principle of its freedom—the very idea 
of absolute form. its retreat into its own principle permits it to know the collapse as the 
powerlessness of the dichotomy to accommodate consciousness’ freedom. 
With the completion of the phenomenological process in the terms just explained—
with consciousness’ liberation from the element of externality—consciousness retreats 
into its absolute form teleologically. Being absolute form its aim is to realize its absolute 
form by producing absolute content as its topos of dwelling. yet the free embracing of 
this aim affirms that consciousness already dwells in the absolute object that, for reasons 
already explained, is pure self-recognition in absolute otherness. having already been 
initially embraced by the absolute content of communal being, consciousness embraces 
this embracing—by undergoing the long purificatory phenomenological process—and 
thereby posits itself as the absolute subject. The realization of this second embracing 
releases science as science ‘in and for itself ’ and thereby makes it possible justifiably to 
begin what was always already open to science, namely actively to engage the thinker 
with the command to know. 
vi. The logical cycle of JusTificaTion 
according to our analysis so far, science fully emerges ‘in and for itself ’ with the 
completion of the phenomenological process that marks the satisfaction of thinker’s de-
mand that science justify the thinker’s dwelling in pure self-recognition and thereby 
renders possible the thinker’s free embracing of this position. in the light of this free 
embracing the thinker is shown to be the vision of himself or herself as a speculative 
thinker—qua absolute form, consciousness’ particularity emerges as the vision of itself 
as a universal. so, within the realm of dwelling in pure conceptuality, and as this dwell-
ing, the thinker is the vision of thinking the notion of thinking and, hence, the vision 
of embracing pure conceptuality as the absolute object that commands pure thinking. 
in purely conceptual terms this vision is comprised of the pure awareness of the abso-
lute object—the moment of universality—that posits out of itself the command to be 
embraced—thought—and its reception—the moment of particularity—along with the 
actual embracing—the moment of individuality. But of course this is the vision of sci-
ence itself or science as vision in relation to whose notion the thinker is the bearer. now 
when we turn to the Science of  Logic we are confronted with the question: ‘with what 
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must the science begin?’ (sl 67). in the light of our earlier analysis one might expect 
the beginning of science to elaborate the process by which the thinker turns from the 
vision of the notion to the activation and realization of the idea of thinking that informs this 
vision. so what is it that activates the thinking incorporated in the thinker’s vision of 
the notion and, relatedly, of the thinker’s vision of himself or herself as a thinker? here 
is what hegel has to say.
now starting from this determination of pure knowledge, all that is needed to 
ensure that the beginning remains immanent in its scientific development is to 
consider, or rather, ridding oneself of all other reflections and opinions whatever, 
simply to take up, what is there before us (sl 69).
When the thinker has the vision of pure thinking and has reached the reflective stage 
of receiving the command to think purely the decision so to speak to begin has already 
been taken and what remains is to work out the precise starting point. here is one way 
of reading hegel’s advice. if the determination of pure knowledge is nothing short of the 
notion, and if it is the notion that is ‘there before us’ then, presumably, we must start by 
simply thinking the thinking that the notion is. a move like this would direct the task of 
thinking to the realization of the vision of the notion of pure thinking that calls for the 
activation of the third part of the Science of  Logic, ‘The doctrine of the notion’. yet, ac-
cording to hegel, from a speculative standpoint, this is a premature step: 
When […] the notion is called the truth of Being and essence, we must expect 
to be asked why we do not begin with the notion? The answer is that, where 
knowledge by thought is our aim, we cannot begin with the truth, because the 
truth, when it forms the beginning, must rest on mere assertion. The truth when 
it is thought must as such verify itself to thought (el § 159 a).
so for hegel the claim that we should not begin with the notion does not rest on the 
observation that we do not yet know it and, consequently, could not immediately begin 
to think the thinking it involves. contrary to first impressions, the concern with Being 
and essence proceeds against the background that the notion is already available to 
the thinker. accordingly, if the thinker does indeed already dwell in the realm of pure 
conceptuality as we have argued, the process of thinking the forms of thought involved 
in Being and essence must somehow nevertheless result from this engagement with the 
notion.
This said, we might ask, is there some discrepancy between hegel’s claim and what 
might seem to follow from our earlier analysis, namely that the thinker should begin the 
logical process by engaging directly with the already available notion? can our account 
of the visionary thinker who freely receives the command to think also explain the ne-
cessity to think the forms of thinking involved in Being and essence as a precondition for 
moving justifiably to the thinking whose task it is to realize the notion? indeed we shall 
argue next that in order to address the command and the vision of the notion as the pri-
mordial form of the notion’s emerging the thinker must become aware of the necessary 
role that Being and essence play in the logical process.17 
     17. a more extensive defence of this interpretive claim would also elaborate on some interesting implica-
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We have argued that in being the vision of thinking the very notion of thinking, 
the thinker already engages with the notion’s emerging in a visionary way. Moreover, 
the vision of the notion qua vision renders explicit the freedom of the thinker’s absolute 
form as well as the absoluteness of the command to think purely. The commanding of 
the command to think purely whilst dwelling in the realm of pure conceptuality—some-
thing that already permeates the thinker’s being—must also be freely received as the 
command and this can be achieved in so far as the thinker retains the visionary aware-
ness of the notion. now to make sense of the freedom that the thinker must exercise in 
this process of receiving the command we must have regard to the idea that both the 
command and its reception are absolute in that they mutually inform each other and 
belong to each other in this way. so, the commanding of the command and the receiv-
ing of its reception are made explicit through their inter-relation. We want to argue next 
that this mutual informing is rendered explicit through the thinker’s visionary encounter 
with the notion. 
now, if the command is indeed absolute then it should permeate the thinker, at 
least substantively or immediately, to begin with. in being immediately commanded 
the thinker already finds himself or herself in the mode of executing what the com-
mand commands. he or she is already in the mode of thinking purely. yet, if we were 
to remain exclusively at the level of the command’s immediate and, hence, unreflective 
reception, the command could not be said to command absolutely since the command-
ing as such that renders it a command in the first place would remain implicit. More 
specifically, if the thinker were directly to execute the command he or she would fail to 
show that the commanding of the command implies that the realization of the notion of 
thinking has yet to be identified and activated. Between the command and its execution 
there is still the gap of the command’s reception. This gap of reception constitutes the 
freedom through which the thinker affirms what the command commands as a project 
to be realized. 
in the absence of this refrain from an immediate execution of the command, the 
command would lack force as such—the thinker’s thinking would depend upon his or 
her contingent will. in the light of the absoluteness of the command whose commanding 
already permeates the thinker, the will to think cannot be contingent. not only is the 
thinker permeated by the command; he or she also opens himself to the command that 
already permeates him, by explicitly receiving it as command. accordingly, the com-
mand is commanded and rendered an explicit command as a result of the thinker’s free 
receiving. The command cannot fail to command given that its free receiving expresses 
the very idea of commanding. 
if our analysis is sound, the thinker’s receiving as receiving makes explicit the not-
yet of the project of thinking the notion that is already incorporated in the command 
in so far as it commands. Moreover, since explicit reception of the command renders 
the idea of commanding explicit, to acknowledge this very receiving—to receive the 
tions of our analysis for the way we should understand the logical beginning with the concepts of being, 
nothing and becoming.
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receiving—is to manifest the absoluteness of the command. now, if the command is in-
deed absolute in the above speculative sense, then it can only be received by its own idea 
of commanding in the form of otherness. otherness is important here, because, as we 
noted above, the receiving of the command as receiving points to the postponement of 
the command’s demand that it be executed. so there is a sense in which the command 
must be disobeyed or at least suspended before it can be freely obeyed. 
at the same time, the command’s absoluteness implies, firstly, that the command 
incorporates the idea of commanding and, secondly, that the thinker’s freedom is no less 
absolute. if the command emerges qua command in the receiving of the thinker and this 
receiving provides the command’s idea, then as this emerging the command receives 
its idea and thereby receives the thinker’s receiving. in other words the command itself 
must incorporate the idea of the not-yet of its call to be executed and thus the idea of 
being received that the thinker’s receiving manifests. conversely, in his or her capacity 
as receiving the command, the thinker is an absolute receiving since, as we have just 
suggested, the command incorporates the idea of its own other, namely the receiving. 
it follows from this inter-relation that the possibility of disobedience—in the sense of 
suspension of the command’s execution—rests on the thinker’s prior embrace of his or 
her obedience to what the command commands in so far as the thinker already fully 
encounters the notion of pure thinking. 
The speculative paradox or mystery here is that the absoluteness of both the com-
mand and the thinker’s freedom are no less manifested through their own other, dis-
obedience and obedience respectively. The command commands—really happens as 
command—in the open field of its reception, a field whose openness presupposes that 
the command has not been obeyed. so too, the reception of the command really hap-
pens as a receiving in so far as the thinker has already opened himself to thinking as such 
and obeyed the command in this way. so rather than demonstrating that the command 
is without force and instead of negating the thinker’s freedom, disobedience and obe-
dience respectively demonstrate that this inter-relation between the command and its 
reception is indeed characterized by the absolute power of free love that we mentioned 
at the outset. 
in the light of the above analysis we will attempt now to specify more precisely the 
link between the idea that the thinker is commanded immediately and hence already has 
access to the notion with the idea that the free reception of the command mediates 
between the command and its execution. We have noted that the thinker must at once 
obey and disobey the command to think. he or she must fully encounter the thinking 
involved in the notion as the precondition for executing this thinking yet without also 
moving immediately to think the notion. This can be achieved only when by dwelling 
in pure conceptuality the thinker has the vision of the notion as a vision. in so far as 
the thinker fully encounters the notion in this vision, the command fully permeates the 
thinker and immediately readies him or her to move on and think the notion. still, in 
so far as the form of the vision also determines this encounter, the notion is encountered 
as the not-yet and, whilst obeying the command, the thinker must nevertheless also be 
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preoccupied with its free reception. 
now to disobey the command in order to receive it freely is to refrain from activating 
the already available notion that immediately permeates the thinker’s thinking. at the 
same time to refrain from activating the notion is not to preclude the notion’s activation. 
instead this refraining signals the thinker’s readiness to think the notion that is itself the 
yet to be activated in its capacity as the vision of the notion. it follows that the notion’s 
own readiness to be thought is the truth of the non-activated notion as well as of the 
notion in the visionary state of the not-yet-activated. it is this truth in the sense that the 
two ideas of the non-activated notion and of the notion as the not-yet-activated are both 
integral moments in the thinker’s awareness of the notion as ready to be thought. The 
notion can indeed be activated because it is presupposed as this truth. 
Moreover, since the visionary thinker is ready to realize the vision thanks to his or 
her visionary being—he or she is at once already in the state of the not-yet as well as 
pointing beyond this state in so far as he or she knows it as the not-yet—the thinker has 
already prereflectively moved beyond these two moments. That is, he or she is already 
beyond the forms of thinking that they incorporate in so far as they are incorporated 
into the thinking of the yet-to-be-activated notion. it follows from this that in order fully 
to appreciate himself or herself as a free thinker who is ready to think the notion, the 
thinker must recollect the mediating role that he or she must have played to this point. 
in other words the thinker must now also freely embrace the freedom manifested in 
receiving the command’s receiving by freely recollecting this thinking as the truth of his 
or her thinking. 
now the truth of thinking with which thinking is already preoccupied must never-
theless spring out of thinking itself. or in other words the truth of pure conceptuality 
must be shown to result from pure conceptuality itself. in so far as the notion incor-
porates other forms of thinking as moments in its thinking, these other forms must be 
capable of being thought in the abovementioned sense of being recollected in ways that 
immanently lead to their notion. Basically this means that the thinker must manifest the 
truth of thinking in the forms of thinking involved in thinking the notion in the two mo-
ments in question. These are the moments of Being and essence in relation to which the 
notion is the truth. To disobey or suspend the command is initially to disregard what the 
command commands—the command to think the notion—as well as to disregard that 
this disregarding belongs to the vision of the notion—the receiving of the command. 
here, the thinker must disengage himself or herself from the thinking of the notion 
whether in the form of actually thinking it or in the form of the vision and the notion 
thus becomes invisible. With this disengagement ‘the notion is implicit and in germ’ in 
its non-activation (el § 83). not only is the notion implicit but also the thinker’s thinking is 
implicit since it does not manifest the notion’s implicitness in the terms of a vision to be 
realized. in the Science of  Logic this sort of radical disengagement is worked out in ‘The 
doctrine of Being’ wherein ‘pure knowing […] ceases itself to be knowledge’ (sl 69) 
and thought is thereby revealed as being ‘thought […] in its immediacy’ (el § 83).
now the activation of the form of thinking that springs from disobeying the com-
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mand in the abovementioned radical sense ultimately shows that such thinking is not 
self-sufficient. The exercise of this form of thought demonstrates that disobedience is 
part of the larger picture of receiving the command to think purely and hence of rec-
ognizing the need to obey the command. in rendering explicit the notion’s implicitness 
this process manifests the notion as yet to be realized. in this way the implicitness of the 
notion is reflectively mediated. still since this process is the notion’s very implicitness, 
the reflection in question is not yet absolute but remains external. 
at the completion of ‘The doctrine of Being’ we have ‘thought […] in its reflecting 
and mediation’ that corresponds to ‘the being-for-self and show of the notion’ (el § 83). 
This is the form of thinking that is practiced in ‘The doctrine of essence’ wherein the 
‘actual unity of the notion is not realized, but only postulated by reflection’ (el § 112). 
now the process of activating and carrying through the forms of thought that are in-
formed by the implicitness of the implicit notion ultimately manifests that which makes 
possible this reflective practice in the first instance, namely the power actually to think 
the notion as such. accordingly, at the completion of ‘The doctrine of essence’ the pro-
cess by which the thinker recollects his or her becoming a thinker manifests the thinker’s 
being as what he or she already is—the free receiving of the command to think and the 
infinite power to think the thinking of the notion. 
 The singularity of the thinker’s ego is thus readied for the journey constituting 
its infinite expansion. This is the point at which ‘the i is the pure notion itself which, as 
notion, has come into existence’. The task of thinking the notion’s unity may therefore 
begin freely and, hence, justifiably (sl 583).
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